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INTRODUCTION

Section 2053 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the executor
to deduct from the gross estate amounts attributable to expenses,
indebtedness, and taxes. This Note will examine problems currently
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confronting an executor who is attempting to utilize the 2053 deduction.
The first problem examined in this Note is the conflict in the
federal courts of appeals regarding the deductibility of expenses
incurred as a result of a sale of decedent's property. The statute,
cases, and regulations in this area will be examined, and a suggested
approach for the executor encountering this problem will be provided.
The second problem considered is the deductibility of interest
incurred to obtain a deferral of estate taxes. Recent Revenue Rulings and cases will be examined in an attempt to ascertain the
deductibility of the interest expense under section 2053. Again, a
suggested resolution to the problem will be provided.
The third problem concerns the validity of recent Revenue Rulings requiring the filing of all claims against the estate in the probate court in order to deduct the claims under section 2053. The
ramifications of these rulings in Tennessee and under the Uniform
Probate Code will be considered, and recommendations will be provided for the executor.
II. THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXPENSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF
SELLING THE DECEDENT'S PROPERTY

A.

Introduction

The transfer of property at death results in the imposition of
the federal estate tax. All property deemed to have been transferred
at death constitutes the gross estate. One of the several items' that
may be deducted from the gross estate in arriving at the taxable
estate is provided in section 2053. That section allows the deduction
of administrative expenses3 if the expenses are allowable by local
1. I.R.C. § 2031.
2. I.R.C. §§ 2052-2056.
3. I.R.C. § 2053(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by § 2001, the value of the taxable
estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such
amounts(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of, property where
the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage or
indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.
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law.' The Internal Revenue Service5 has imposed additional requirements for deductibility in Treasury Regulations sectiofis 20.20533(a) and (d). According to the Service, a deduction for expenses
connected with the sale of property of the estate will be allowed only
if the sale is necessary to pay debts, expenses of administration, or
taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution of the estate.
This necessity requirement, coupled with the IRS dictate that the
selling expenses be for the benefit of the estate, has created a
considerable problem for federal and state courts determining the
federal tax effect to be given local probate court decrees allowing
particular selling expenses as administration expenses.
B.
(1)

The Conflict in the Circuits
Estate of Park v. Commissioner7

In 1973 the Sixth Circuit considered the validity of the Service's
section 2053 regulations in Estate of Park v. Commissioner." In
Park, the decedent died testate leaving a probate estate valued at
$123,234.51. 9 Included in the probate estate were the decedent's
4. Section 2053(a) of the 1954 Code uses the word "allowable" instead of "allowed" as
was used in § 812(b) of the 1939 Code. This change implies that the probate court of the local
jurisdiction need not actually pass on the merits of every claim in order to ensure deductibility. 4 J. RABKIN & M. JoHesoN, FED. INc., Gipr & EST. TAX. 53.02; C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER
& J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 376 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
LoWNDES].

5. Hereinafter cited as the IRS or the Service.
6. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958) provides:
(a) In general. The amounts deductible from a decedent's gross estate as
"administration expenses" of the first category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of § 20.20531) are limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of the decedent's estate; that is in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the
law are such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property
of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether the trustee is the executor
or some other person. Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of the estate,
but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be
taken as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2)
attorney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses. Each of these classes is considered
separately in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1965) provides in part:
Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the
estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase "expenses for selling property" includes
brokerage fees and other expenses attending the sale, such as the fees of an auctioneer
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one. ...
7. 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973).
8. Id.
9. The following items comprised the probate estate:
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residence worth $52,000.00 and a summer cottage worth
$24,750.00.10 The decedent's four sons who received the two pieces
of real estate under the residuary clause of the will, decided they
would rather receive cash than receive property. Accordingly, they
directed the executor to sell the property as he was authorized to
do under the will." As a result of the sale of the real estate, the
executor incurred $4,285.30 in expenses. This amount was included
in the amount approved by the Michigan probate court as administration expenses. The sale expenses were included in the executor's
section 2053 estate tax deduction. The deduction of $4,285.30 was
disallowed by the Commissioner, 12 and that ruling was affirmed by
the Tax Court. 3
The Tax Court opinion was based primarily on the petitioners'
failure to satisfy the requirements of the regulations under section
2053.14 The Tax Court determined that the expense was not
necessary for the proper administration of the estate, but was instead an expenditure for the individual benefit of the devisees. 15
In the Court of Appeals, the Commissioner used the same arguments that had brought him success in the Tax Court:
Residence
Cottage
U.S. Savings Bonds, Series E
350 Shares Contingentla Associates,
Inc., common stock
Cash in bank account
Social Security benefit
Income on hand and accrued due
deceased's estate from Trust Accounts
Household furniture at 253 Lewiston
Road
Household furniture and personal
effects at 2315 Lake Shore Road
Jewelry
Refund of overpayment of 1967
Federal income tax
Proceeds from Connecticut General
annuity policy

$52,000.00
24,750.00
24,069.62
350.00
1,807.45
97.90
6,625.55
5,841.25
250.00
2,090.75
347.61
5,004.38
$123,234.51

Id. at 674.
10. See note 9 supra.
11. 475 F.2d at 674.
12. Id.
13. 57 T.C. 705 (1972).
14. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-3(a) (1958), 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1965); see note 6 supra.
15. 57 T.C. at 709. The Tax Court did not specifically pass on the validity of the
regulations. It did note, however, that the regulations had been accepted in previous cases
including Estate of Smith, 57 T.C. 650 (1972).
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The respondent relies on the majority approach expressed in Smith, to the
effect that the provisions of § 2053(a) establish only a threshold consideration.
When state law fails adequately to coincide with federal estate tax policies, as
reflected in the Treasury Regulations, then the deduction should not be allowed. . . . Consequently, the regulations are valid and must be complied
with in order for the expenses to be deductible. 6

The taxpayer contended that the regulations were invalid as an
impermissible restriction on the availability of a deduction provided
in the Internal Revenue Code. According to the taxpayer, the only
requirement for deductibility under section 2053 was that the expenses be allowable under local law. 7 Thus the issue confronting the
Sixth Circuit was clear: whether Treasury Regulations sections
20.2053-3(a) and 20.2053-3(d) (2) must be complied with, in addition
to showing allowability of the expense under local law, in order for
expenses to be deductible under section 2053.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court first considered the
Tax Court decision of Estate of David Smith" and rejected that
court's rationale for requiring adherance to the Service's regulations. In so doing, the court itemized numerous reasons for rejecting
the contentions of the IRS. Foremost among these reasons was the
court's literal reading of the statute. The court stated that the statute required only that the expense be allowable under local law. It
found no statutory requirement that the expense be necessary for
one of the purposes set forth in the regulations or that the expense
only be for the benefit of the estate. The court thought that Congress
committed to the discretion of state law the question whether the
expense was necessary.9 The court also found an untenable distinction in the regulation's requirement that the expense benefit the
estate and not the beneficiary."
The court also identified a practical problem presented by the
regulations. The court believed that a prudent fiduciary often will
be called upon to dispose of nonincome-producing property even
though it is not "necessary" under the regulations. The court felt
that in such a situation the good faith judgment of the fiduciary, as
approved by the probate court, should not be influenced by the
unwarranted intrusion of the regulations' "necessary" require21
ment.
16.
17.
18.
19.

475 F.2d at 675.
There was no question that Michigan law allowed these expenses. Id.
57 T.C. 650 (1972); see notes 22-41 infra and accompanying text.
475 F.2d at 676.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 676-77.
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Estate of Smith v. Commissioner22

In 1975 the Second Circuit confronted the same issue that had
been presented to the Sixth Circuit in Park two years earlier. In
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,2 the deceased artist's estate included 24 425 pieces of abstract metal sculpture. 25 In order to ensure
the highest return possible on these assets, the three executors engaged in an orderly process of gradual liquidation over a period of
eight years. 26 During this time nearly $1.6 million were paid in commissions to the art gallery disposing of the pieces of sculpture.27 The
New York Surrogate's Court allowed this sum, and the executors
contended that this amount was deductible on the federal estate tax
return as an administration expense under section 2053(a).
In 1969, nearly three years after the filing of the estate tax
return, the Commissioner increased the value of Smith's estate and
disallowed as a deduction under section 2053(a) (2) any commissions
in excess of $289,662.29 The Tax Court, in a de novo review, reduced
the asserted value of the estate and allowed only $750,447.74 as a
section 2053 deduction for sales commissions. This allowance
equaled the amount necessary to pay the decedent's debts, taxes,
and expenses of administration. 0 The Tax Court stated that the
allowability of the expenses under local law represented only a
threshold requirement and that the IRS regulations" also had to be
22. 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
23. Id.
24. In addition to the pieces of sculpture, the estate included liquid assets totalling
$210,647.08. 510 F.2d at 480.
25. Decedent is recognized as one of the leading American sculptors of nonrepresentational forms. Since the 1930's he produced more than 500 major and often monumental (up
to fifteen feet high) works. Unfortunately, most of the public acclaim and financial success
of Smith's art was posthumous. Echter, Equitable Treatment for the Artists's Estate-the
Tax Court Takes a FirstStep, 114 TRusTs & EST. 394 (1975).
26. As mentioned in note 25 supra, Smith was not a commercially successful artist
during his lifetime. Accordingly, the executors believed that a public auction of all the works
would have revealed the large number of works in the estate and would have caused a severe
decline in their value. Thus the gradual disposition as authorized by Smith's will. 510 F.2d
at 480; see 57 T.C. 650, 654 (1972); 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 372 (1975).
27. Pursuant to a 1963 contract that was renewed by the executors in 1968 and 1970,
the Marlborough-Gerson Galleries were entitled to a one-third commission on the net proceeds of the sales. In 1970 $1,187,144.67 in commissions were paid, and from 1970 to 1973
$396,400 in commissions were also received by the galleries. 510 F.2d at 480.
28. 57 T.C. at 654; 510 F.2d at 481-82.
29. In 1966 the estate tax return was filed and a deficiency was paid in 1968. In 1969
the Commissioner issued a deficiency note for $2,444,629.17, based on a new valuation of the
estate at $5,256,918 and a disallowance of a deduction for commissions in excess of
$289,661.65. Id.
30. 57 T.C. at 662 & n. 15; 510 F.2d at 481.
31. See note 6 supra.
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satisfied in order for the selling expenses to be deductible. Accordingly, only $750,447.74 could be allowed as a section 2053 deduction
because only that amount was "necessary" to pay the decedent's
debts, taxes, and expenses of administration. 2
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the taxpayer maintained that
the entire sum paid in commissions should be deductible because*
the taxpayer complied with the regulations. According to the executors, their fiduciary obligations to liquidate the estate and diversify
the nature of the assets held by the estate qualified the commissions
as necessary expenditures. The executors further argued that the
local court's allowance of the expenses established their deductibility, and that, if the regulations served to disallow the deduction,
they were invalid.3 The Commissioner countered by arguing that
the expenses were not incurred out of necessity as required by the
regulations, but instead were incurred for the benefit of the
legatees.34
In finding for the Commissioner, the Second Circuit noted that
a local probate court often will not give proper consideration to the
interests of the federal taxing authority.35 In such circumstances,
under Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,3" the local court's determination of allowability is not controlling37 and cannot preclude a
federal court from reexamining the probate court's decision that the
expenditures were necessary expenses of administration.3 8 The court
then stated that the Tax Court's opinion should be affirmed because
its appropriate de novo review was not clearly erroneous. The court
32. 57 T.C. at 662 & n.15; 510 F.2d at 481.
33. 510 F.2d at 481-82.
34. Id. at 482.
35. Id.; see Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
36. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). For an explanation of the Bosch decision, see notes 49-54 infra
and accompanying text.
37. The court's opinion that a local court's decree is not controlling was partially based
on Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1958), which provides in part:
(2) Effect of court decree. The decision of a local court as to the amount and allowability under local law of a claim of administration expense will ordinarily be accepted if
the court passes upon the facts upon which deductibility depends. If the court does not
pass upon those facts, its decree will, of course, not be followed. For example, if the
question before the court is whether a claim should be allowed, the decree allowing it
will ordinarily be accepted as establishing the validity and amount of the claim. However, the decree will not necessarily be accepted even though it purports to decide the
facts upon which deductibility depends. It must appear that the court actually passed
upon the merits of the claim. . ..
38. The court stated:
[Tihere is some question as to whether some of these expenses were in fact incurred
for the benefit of the estate in accordance with the general purposes of § 2053 rather than
for the benefit of the individual beneficiaries.
510 F.2d at 482; see Tress. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958), note 6 supra.
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stated that it was not required to pass on the validity of the Service's
regulations because the state law governing the administration of
the estate required all expenses to be "necessary." Accordingly, any
requirement of "necessity" was imposed by local law and not by the
regulations." Presumably, this rationale explains the court's omission of a discussion of the Park case.4" The dissent found the majority's failure to discuss Park disturbing and agreed with the Park
holding that the regulations were unwarranted extensions of the
statute.41
C. A CriticalAnalysis of Park and Smith
In determining whether Park or Smith represents the better
view regarding the deductibility of the expenses of selling assets in
the probate estate, it should be remembered that an important
difference exists between legislative regulations and interpretive
regulations. Legislative regulations result from Congress's specific
delegation of its rulemaking authority to the Internal Revenue Service. When regulations of this form exist, they must be adhered to
in order to achieve compliance with the statutory section under
which they were promulgated. On the other hand, interpretive regulations merely represent the views of the Internal Revenue Service
regarding the meaning of the statutory section to which they are
addressed. The regulations pertaining to administration expenses
under section 2053(a) are interpretive regulations." Thus compliance with these regulations cannot be required if they do not clearly
reflect the meaning of the statute.
It is essentially the position of the Commissioner that the regulations are consistent with the statute. The Commissioner maintains that the language of section 2053(a)(2) imposes two tests.
First, the expenditure must constitute an "administration expense;" secondly, the expense must be "allowable" by the state
probate court. The Commissioner then reasons that the regulations
imposing the requirements of necessity and benefit only to the estate merely reflect a valid interpretation of the requirement that the
expenditures be "administration expenses." 43 In effect, the Smith
39. 510 F.2d at 483.
40. The court did not even state why it was not necessary to discuss Park.
41. 510 F.2d at 483-85.
42. A reading of § 2053(a) clearly indicates that Congress has not delegated its rulemaking powers to the Internal Revenue Service. This is to be contrasted with § 2053(d)(1) where
the statute specifically authorizes the Service to promulgate the governing guidelines.
43. Spragens, CurrentAppellate Cases Create Conflict in Deductibility of Selling Costs
as Administration Expenses Under Sec. 2053(a)(2), 54 TAxEs 429, 434 (1976).
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case validated this position even though that court disclaimed the
necessity of passing on the regulation's validity.4 This disclaimer is
unpersuasive in view of the court's affirmance of the Tax Court
decision that did require adherance to the regulations. Further, subsequent decisions have interpreted Smith as requiring compliance
with the regulations in order to obtain the deduction.15 Thus Smith
clearly conflicts with Park because Park specifically invalidated the
Commissioner's regulations. To determine which opinion is correct,
an analysis of the cases on which they are based is required.
The Smith court cited Pitner v. United States46 as authority for
the proposition that federal courts should be allowed to determine
deductibility under the appropriate federal standard because local
probate courts do not always adequately consider the interests of the
federal taxing authority. While this is probably a valid synthesis of
the Pitnerdecision, the context of the Pitner case does not support
the Smith court's extension of this proposition. Pitneronly allowed
a reexamination of the probate court's ruling in two areas. First, it
allowed the federal court to reconsider the question whether the
expenditures qualified as "administration expenses;" secondly, it
authorized the federal court to redetermine whether the expense was
"reasonable." 7 Thus, while Pitner does acknowledge a possible conflict between the state courts and the IRS, it does not authorize an
unlimited reexamination of the probate court's decision. Accordingly, it appears that the Second Circuit erroneously relied on
Pitner when it approved the Tax Court's reconsideration of the probate court's decision in order to ascertain whether the expense was
solely for the benefit of the estate. 8 The "benefit" test is found only
in the regulations-not in Pitner.
Perhaps the cornerstone of the Smith decision was its reliance
on Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch" as authority for a de novo
determination whether the expenses were necessary." Again this
reliance is misplaced. In Bosch the United States Supreme Court
stated that a federal court can make its own determination of state
law and is not bound by a lower state court interpretation.5 1 In
Smith, however, the court used Bosch to justify the federal court's
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 77-87 infra and accompanying text.
388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 659.
510 F.2d at 482.
387 U.S. 456 (1967).
510 F.2d at 482-83.
387 U.S. at 463-64.
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new findings of fact and then found the facts insufficient to allow
the deduction under the requirements of the regulations. This was
certainly not a simple reexamination of the state law of New York.
Perhaps the clearest example of the Smith court's misconstruction of the Bosch decision can be seen by examining the following
portion of the Bosch opinion:
We find that the report of the Senate Finance Committee recommending
enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded language in referring
to the very question involved here. It is said that "proper regard," not finality,
"should be given to interpretations of the will" by state courts and then only
when entered by a court "in a bona fide adversary proceeding." S. Rep. No.
1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. We cannot say that the authors of this
directive intended that the decrees of state trial courts were to be conclusive
and binding on the computation of the federal estate tax as levied by the
Congress. If the Congress had intended state trialcourt determinationsto have
that effect on the federalactions, it certainlywould have said so-which it did
not do.5

Note that the Court in Bosch was considering the marital deduction
under section 2056. In contrast, section 2053(a) does proclaim that
state court determinations are conclusive: "[t]he taxable estate
shall be determined by deducting . . .such amounts . . .as are
allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction. . ...
-1 Thus the Bosch

decision does not support the Smith opinion.
In addition to the weak foundation provided by prior case law,
neither the longstanding nature of the regulations nor the principle
of statutory reenactment 55 support Smith. Although the regulations
have remained substantially unchanged since 1919,56 the legislative
history of section 2053(a) does not indicate congressional approval
of the definition of administration expenses set forth in the regulations." Further, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 left section 2053 substantially unchanged even though Congress was certainly aware of
the appellate conflict surrounding that portion of the Code. Accordingly, any arguments of congressional approval or longevity do not
justify the Smith decision.
Having considered the primary authorities relied upon by the
Smith court, it is also appropriate to examine those authorities
allegedly supportive of Park. The Park opinion primarily consisted
52. 510 F.2d at 482-83; see 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 376-77 (1975).
53. 387 U.S. at 463-64 (emphasis added).
54. See note 3 supra.
55. See Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673, 676-77 (6th Cir. 1973); 52 N.C.L.
Rav. 190, 193-94 (1973); 17 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 363, 380-81 (1975).
56. 57 T.C. at 664.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954).

1977]

SECTION 2053 DEDUCTION

of a discussion of the Tax Court decision in Smith and a literal
statutory interpretation of section 2053. The only supportive authorities mentioned by the Park court were Union Commerce Bank v.
Commissioner" and Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner.-9 These
cases, however, merely hold that state law is controlling in section
2053 cases and do not examine the validity of requirements contained in the regulations. 0 In essence, the Park decision rests almost
entirely on the Sixth Circuit's view that the requirements of the
regulations simply cannot be harmonized with the language in section 2053(a) making state law controlling.
Despite the Sixth Circuit's failure to rely on previous authorities, past decisions support the Park analysis. In Union Commerce
Bank v. Commissioner,61 the court clearly stated that state law
alone controlled section 2053(a) deductions. 2 A similar statement
was made by the court in Commercial National Bank of Charlotte
v. United States." Although these decisions do not exhaustively
examine the validity of the regulations, they do show that the Park
court was not the first tribunal to find that allowability under local
law is the only test that must be satisfied for deductibility under
section 2053(a).
Having considered the judicial authorities relevant to the positions adopted by the Park and Smith courts, it is also appropriate
to examine the problems presented by the decisions. Foremost
among these problems is the potential conflict between the regulations (validated by Smith) and the fiduciary's duty to preserve the
estate. If an asset is not producing income, but instead is draining
the estate through maintenance costs, the prudent fiduciary would
be wise (and perhaps required) to dispose of the asset. This action
would preserve the estate by generating liquid assets to be invested
in income-producing property and by eliminating maintenance expenditures.64 Nevertheless, it is entirely likely that the Commis58. 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964).
59. 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
60. In Goodwin's Estate the court did approve the regulation concerning the effect of a
state court decree (see Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2), note 37 supra). The court did not
consider the "necessity" and "benefit" requirements in the Service's regulations and therefore does not directly support Park's rejection of these requirements. 201 F.2d at 580.
61. 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964).
62. The court simply stated: "This court has previously recognized the express language
of this provision as making state law controlling." Id. at 168.
63. 196 F.2d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1952); cf. Ballance v. United States, 347 F.2d 419, 422
(7th Cir. 1965). But see Estate of Swayne v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 190 (1964).
64. 52 N.C.L. Rav. 190, 196-97 (1973). It also should be noted that in some states realty
vests at the moment of death. In those states the maintenance expenditures often will be
incurred by the beneficiary and not the executor.
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sioner would find the expenses of the sale unnecessary under his
regulations. With the deduction disallowed, the executor would
have no choice but to absorb the maintenance costs if the expenses
of the sale would be nearly equal to the maintenance expenses.
Another problem would arise if the executor finds that a large
portion of the estate consists of one kind of property. Under these
circumstances it would be prudent to dispose of some of the assets
to achieve diversification. Despite the desirability of this diversification, it is unlikely that the Service would find the activity to be
"'necessary."
Additionally, the executor may foresee the need for cash and
decide to sell some of the estate's assets. Under Smith, his deduction for selling expenses will be limited to that amount necessary for
debts, expenses, and taxes. How is the executor to know how much
this will be? The problem will be magnified when the assets are
difficult to value and are of such a nature that they are not easily
marketable. In this situation the executor will be forced to guess as
to his cash needs and will incur a severe penalty for error. 5
An obvious problem created by the Smith decision is that federal courts now may have to review many approved expenditures.
This violation of the principle of judicial economy 8 could be rectified by allowing the local probate court to pass on the expenses. The
probate court's intimate relationship with the fiduciary would allow
it to determine more accurately the estate's requirements and best
interests

67

Another problem stems from Smith's continued requirement
that the expenditures be for the benefit of the estate and not the
beneficiaries. The Service can always use the benefit test to make
out a prima facie case because any action benefitting the estate also
will benefit the heirs, legatees, and beneficiaries. 8 Accordingly, the
test is unworkable and should not be made controlling.
Finally, there is the convenience factor. It is certainly much
easier for both the executor and the beneficiaries to deal in cash."
This creates a need to provide the executors with discretion, which
is necessary to enable the executor to fulfill the obligations his oath
requires. Allowing the executor this flexibility would not defeat the
65. 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 382 (1975); Spragens, CurrentAppellate Cases Create
Conflict in Deductibility of Selling Costs as AdministrationExpenses Under Sec. 2053(a)(2),
54 TAXEs 429, 435 (1976).
66. 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 380 (1975).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 52 N.C.L. REv. 190, 197 (1973).
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interests of the IRS because the state probate court can only approve the expenses allowed by local law. Thus the regulations and
the Smith case are not supported by the case law or by the practicalities of estate administration. Park is the better view and should be
followed.
D.

The Reaction of the Courts

Nine decisions subsequent to Smith and Park have considered
the issue herein discussed. Only two of the cases seem to have followed Park. In the first of these, Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner,1
the executor sold over four million dollars worth of the decedent's
stock in a secondary offering, thereby incurring $70,203.69 in selling
expenses.7' After noting that the Commissioner did not contend that
the expenses were unnecessary,72 the Tax Court stated that the expenses were deductible because the California probate court had
allowed the expenditures as expenses of administration.7 3 Thus,
even though the validity of the regulations was not directly in issue,
the court placed great weight on the probate court's determination
of allowability.
A stronger statement of approval of the Park decision can be
found in In re Estate of Larson.74 In that case the executor sold some
of the decedent's real estate in order to make a proper distribution
of the estate assets. The New York Surrogate's Court found the
expense to be deductible for state inheritance tax purposes 75 and
formally approved Park, describing the reasoning as "sound and
7
reasonable."
Like the cases approving the Park position, the cases upholding
Smith generally fail to engage in an in depth analysis of the validity
of the regulations. Instead, they merely accept the Smith case as
controlling precedent. As an example, consider the case of Estate of
Streeter v. Commissioner,7 in which the court disallowed a deduction for auctioneers' commissions because the expenses were those
of the trust and not the estate. The court indicated that compliance
70. 63 T.C. 478 (1975).
71. 250,000 of the decedent's 264,396 shares were sold resulting in proceeds of
$4,523,750.00. The executor then claimed a § 2053 deduction for $70,203.69 in selling expenses
and $288,750.00 representing the discount given to the underwriters.
72. 63 T.C. at 482.
73. Id. at 483.
74. 87 Misc. 2d 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
75. Under New York law the expense was deductible for inheritance tax purposes only
if it would be allowable as an expense for federal purposes under § 2053. Id.
76. Id.
77. 491 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 1175 (1971).
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with the regulations was required and stated that the expenses
would have been deductible had they been expenses of the estate
because the fees were "reasonable." 7 8 Similarly, in Estate of Agnew
v. Commissioner,79 the court cited Smith for the proposition that:
[Flederal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining a lower state court's
allowance of administration expenses to determine whether they were in fact
necessary to carry out the administration of the estate or merely prudent or
advisable in preserving the interests of the beneficiaries."

In 1975, two federal district court decisions also approved the

Smith standard. In Payne v. United States,"' the executors sought
to deduct $8,286.48 in expenses incurred as a result of the sale of
real property worth $100,000. Noting the contrary authority of
Park, the court stated that a federal court could not be precluded
from redetermining whether the expense was an "administration
expense" under section 2053.82 According to the court, this allowed
them to consider whether the sale was "necessary to the administration of the estate.

83

A California district court followed a similar

approach in HiberniaBank v. United States.84 There the court considered both the Park and Smith decisions. Approving the latter,
the court "rejected the proposition that the only requirement for
deducting an administrative expense is that a state court has determined the expense is allowable under state law." '
Perhaps the most recent case approving the Smith opinion is
86 In Webster the Tax Court
Estate of Webster v. Commissioner.
simply stated that the regulations had to be satisfied as set forth in
the Smith decision. 7 This clear statement upholding the validity of
the regulations is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the Tax
Court's memorandum decision in Estate of Carson v.
78. Id.
79. 34 T.C.M. (P-H) 758 (1975).
80. Id. at 761.
81. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,059 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
82. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
83. The Payne court found that the expense was not necessary because there was a
sufficient sum of cash in the estate to pay taxes, debts, and expenses. The court therefore
thought that the sale was for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not the estate. 75-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 13,059 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
84. 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,102 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
85. Id. at 88,899. Having adopted the Smith standards, the court rejected the executor's
claim of a deduction for interest incurred on loans used to pay the estate tax. The court found
that the executor could not satisfy the tests of allowability under state law, reasonableness,
and no benefit to the beneficiaries. Id.
86. 65 T.C. 968 (1976).
87. Id. at 979-80.
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Commissioner." In Carson, the court stated that the regulations
were not in issue because local law (Illinois) also required that the
expenditures be "necessary." 9 Nonetheless, the court noted the
conflict between the circuits, as represented by Park and Smith,
and stated that it did not need to "take a position on this question."'" This may represent a conflict with the Tax Court's own
opinion in Webster.
Perhaps the most important decision subsequent to Smith and
Park is the Tax Court case of Estate of Vatter v. Commissioner,'
which was affirmed in a per curiam opinion by the Second Circuit.
In Vatter, the decedent owned three rental properties requiring
maintenance. Pursuant to a provision in the will giving both the
executor and the trustee the power to sell the properties, the executor sold the properties and claimed a section 2053 deduction for the
expenses incurred from the sale. The IRS claimed that the sale was
not necessary as required by the regulations. The taxpayer alternatively claimed that the sale was necessary to effectuate distribution
and that the plain meaning of the statute required reliance on the
state court's finding of allowability. 2 In sustaining the taxpayer's
position, the Tax Court found it necessary to distinguish the Smith
case. According to the court, the Smith court was required to pass
on the necessity of the sale because Smith's will contemplated a
specific devise or distribution in kind of the property. In contrast,
the Vatter will clearly authorized the executor to sell the property;
thus the Smith case was not controlling. 3 The Vatter court also
88. 1976 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,073.
89. At issue in Carsonwas the deductibility of the selling expenses incurred upon a sale
of the decedent's residence. In disallowing the deduction, the court found that the expenses
were incurred by the wife and not by the executor because the property had passed to her by
operation of law due to her joint tenancy with the decedent. Id.
90. Id. at 327.
91. 65 T.C. 633 (1975), aff'd per curiam, [1976] FED. TAXEs (P-H) 148,129 (2d Cir.
Nov. 29, 1976).
92. Id.
93. In order to distinguish the Smith case, the court had to engage in a four-step
analysis. First, the court found the instant factual situation to be similar to Estate of Stemberger, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on othergrounds, 348 U.S.
187 (1955). In both cases the executor was given the power to sell the real property. Secondly,
the court noted that the Smith court failed to distinguish Sternberger,but instead relied on
Estate of Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964). Thirdly, the court discussed the differences in Swayne
and Sternberger. In Sternbergerthe only question was whether the expenses were attributable
to the estate or the trust. In contrast, the Swayne court had to decide whether the expenses
were necessary at all since the will did not authorize the executor to sell the property. Finally,
the court noted that the Smith and Swayne cases contemplated a distribution in kind or
specific devise of the assets. Since Sternbergerand the instant case contemplated no similar

procedure, the Smith and Swayne cases were distinguishable. Id. at 637-38.
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indicated that because the trustee did not wish to receive a distribution of rental real estate, the sale was necessary in order to effect
the distribution of the estate." These two factors led the court to
believe that the Vatter case presented no conflict with the regulations.95
The importance of the Vatter decision, as affirmed by the Second Circuit, is that it identifies two relatively easy means of avoiding or complying with the regulations. First, a provision in the will
authorizing the executor to sell the assets seems to be a vehicle for
escaping the necessity requirement so prominent in Smith and the
regulations. Secondly, if a trust is used in the decedent's estate
plan, a simple refusal by the trustee to accept non-liquid assets will
mean that the sale was necessary in order to effectuate distribution.
Thus, by utilizing these two devices, an alert estate planner probably can avoid the tremendous problems inherent in the Smith
case 5 -and do so with the apparent approval of the two courts most
steadfast in requiring compliance with the regulations.
E. Implications of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
As discussed earlier, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 did not significantly alter section 2053 of the Code. This should not, however, be
taken to mean that the Tax Reform Act did not affect the deductibility of expenses incurred in the sale of probate assets by the executor. In fact, changes in section 642(g) will have serious implications
for the executor taking the 2053 deduction.
Section 642(g) of the 1954 Code, entitled "Disallowance of Double Deductions," prohibited an executor from deducting the same
item on both the estate tax return under section 2053 and on the
estate's income tax return. 8 This provision, if literally applied,
94. Id. at 639.
95. Id. at 637, 639 n.5.
96. See notes 64-69 supra and accompanying text. See also Hibernia Bank v. United
States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,102 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
97. The only changes were those made by Title XIX of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
referred to as the "Deadwood Bill."
98. Section 642(g) of the 1954 Code provided:
Amounts allowable under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in computing the
taxable estate of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable
income of the estate or any other person, unless there is filed, within the time and in
the manner and form prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a statement that the
amounts have not been allowed as deductions under section 2053 or 2054 and a waiver
of the right to have such amounts allowed at any time as deductions under section 2053
or 2054. This subsection shall not apply with respect to deductions allowed under part
II (relating to income in respect of decedents).
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would prevent the expenses of a sale of the decedent's property from
being deducted on both the estate and income tax returns. Nonetheless, in Estate of Bray,"9 the Tax Court held that these expenses may
be set off against the gross proceeds received upon the sale of assets
by the estate (in computing capital gain or loss), in addition to being
a valid deduction for federal estate tax purposes. Thus the estate
could receive a double tax benefit upon the sale of these assets.
Eventually, the Service acceded to this position.100
The 1976 Act clearly changes section 642(g) to prohibit the use
of double deductions as authorized in Bray.101 This statutory change
may make it unwise for an executor to challenge the validity of the
2053 regulations. Since the deduction probably will be available on
the income tax return, and since the deduction can be used only
once, it may be a waste of time, effort, and money to challenge the
Commissioner's regulations in order to obtain the estate tax deduction. This determination, however, is not as simple as its first appears. A decision to take the expenses as an income tax deduction
may have the serious collateral consequence of benefitting the income beneficiary at the expense of the remaindermen. This is especially true where the income tax deduction causes an increase in the
amount passing to the surviving spouse under a will containing a
formula clause. ' In such a case, the executor must be aware that
he may be required to make compensating adjustments to the
remainderman's interest. In these situations the "Warm's Adjustment" may be used increasingly to reconcile the problem.0 3 In addition, the different tax brackets of the estate, beneficiaries, and any
existing trusts may further complicate the executor's decision. In
any event, the choice facing the executor clearly is not entirely
alleviated, and the 1976 changes will be extremely important in the
years to come.
F.

Conclusion

In reviewing the material presented thus far it is clear that
99. 46 T.C. 577 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 396 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1968).
100. Rev. Rul. 71-173, 1971-1 C.B. 204.
101. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed § 642(g) to read:
Amounts allowable under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in computing the
taxable estate of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction, (or as an offset against

the sales price of property in determining gain or loss) in computing the taxable income
of the estate or of any other person, unless there is filed. ...
(language added by the 1976 Act emphasized)
102.
103.

LowNDEs, supra note 4, at 376.
Id.
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there is a distinct conflict in the circuits over this problem despite
the courts' refusal to acknowledge it. The Park case represents the
better of the two major decisions addressing this issue. Both the
supporting cases and an accurate reading of the statute support this
conclusion. Furthermore, the practical problems created by the
Smith decision are numerous and severe. Despite this fact, subsequent cases have been more prone to adopt the Smith decision than
the Park decision. Nevertheless, the executor can be saved these
problems if the estate planner utilizes the Vatter decision to avoid
the regulations. By empowering the executor to sell the assets, and
by having the trustee refuse to accept property in kind, the estate
still should be able to take the section 2053 estate tax deduction. It
should be noted, however, that section 642(g) of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 has made it impossible to obtain the benefit of the off-set
against sales price in determining gain or loss in computing the
income tax. Thus, although the estate deduction probably can be
obtained, the executor must consider the collateral consequences of
foregoing the income tax deduction. As a result, we can expect to
see an increased use of the "Warm's Adjustment" and continued
litigation in the courts over the validity of the regulations.
III.

THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF INTEREST PAYMENTS INCURRED TO OBTAIN
A DEFERRAL OF THE ESTATE TAX

A.

Introduction

An executor often will find that he does not have a sufficient
amount of cash to pay the estate tax when it becomes due. This
could easily happen when the bulk of the estate consists of a closely
held business or when there is no readily identifiable market for the
estate's major assets. In this situation the executor has three
choices. First, he could dispose of the assets at a loss (and probably
against the wishes of the testator and the beneficiaries). Secondly,
the executor could obtain a commercial loan and immediately pay
the estate tax. This procedure would give the executor a period of
years to generate sums to pay back the loan. Thirdly, the executor
could attempt to qualify under the deferral sections of the Code and
pay the estate tax in installments over a period of years. Clearly the
second and third choices are more desirable than the first. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to an inquiry into the financial
advisability of obtaining a commercial loan instead of utilizing the
deferral procedures provided in the Code. The answer to this question requires a consideration of the deductibility of the interest
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charges as an administration expense under section 2053.1"4 At the
heart of the issue is Revenue Ruling 75-239,05 which prohibits a
section 2053 deduction for interest paid under the deferral sections
of the Code. In contrast, the cases seem to indicate that interest
paid on a commercial loan will be deductible. Accordingly, the statute, cases, revenue rulings, and regulations bearing on this issue will
be examined, and a recommendation will be provided for the executor confronted with this dilemma.
B.
(1)

The Statutory Framework
The Statute Before 1976

Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, three Code sections could
be utilized to obtain an extension of the date for payment of the
estate tax.' 6 One of these was section 6166. Under section 6166, an
executor could elect'07 to pay the estate tax in up to ten annual
installments if the estate's major asset was a closely held business.'s8
It was believed that the deferral period would give the business
enough time to generate earnings and profits with which to pay the
tax and thereby avoid a forced sale of the business.'' The entire
estate tax, however, could not be deferred for ten years. Instead,
only the amount of tax attributable to the closely held business
could be deferred,"" and the first installment was due on the regular
due date along with the tax not eligible for deferment."' In order to
qualify for the 6166 deferral, the interests or interest in a closely held
business had to exceed thirty-five percent of the gross estate or fifty
104. See note 3 supra.
105. 1975-1 C.B. 304.
106. See Joseph, Several Routes Are Available to Obtaining an Extension to File and
Pay Federal Estate Tax, 14 TAX. FOR AccouTArrs 372 (1975).
107. Under § 6166(a) the election must be made before the due date for filing the return.
108. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(a); see Hocky, Estate Tax Payments and Liabilities,
in 219 TAX MNGM'T (2d ed. BNA) [hereinafter cited as HocKY]. The election can be for less
than the maximum amount deferrable and for a period shorter than ten years. This is not
usually done because an election once made cannot be changed other than by an election to
accelerate the payments. Accordingly, an executor normally will elect to defer the maximum
amount for 10 years.
109. H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
110. In determining the amount eligible for deferment, this simple formula can be used:
value of the closely held business
X estate tax = amount eligible for deferment.
value of the gross estate
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(b); see Hococ, supra note 108, at A-4.
111. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(e); see HocKy, supra note 108, at A-4. Thus the
maximum amount of time for deferral could have been nine years from the date the tax
originally was due.
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percent of the taxable estate.11 2 Further, the Code provided additional limitations by-defining "closely held business." To qualify,
the decedent's interest in the proprietorship, partnership, or corporation had to constitute a stated percentage of the total interests in
the business.13 The Code also provided for an automatic termination of the installment privilege and an acceleration of the remaining installments if the estate had undistributed net income after the
fourth year; money was withdrawn from the business; the business
was disposed of; or the installment payments were not made when
4
due."
The second major statutory provision allowing an extension of
the time to pay the estate tax was section 6163. Under section 6163,
if a reversionary or remainder interest was included in the taxable
estate, the tax attributable to that interest could be postponed until
six months after the termination of the preceding interest."' This
provision prevented the hardship imposed by taxing an interest that
was not readily salable or readily available as security for a loan." '
In addition, if "undue hardship" existed, payment with respect to
the reversionary or remainder interest could be deferred an additional three years following the six month period after the termina7
tion of the preceding estate."1
112. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(a). These values shall be values determined for
federal estate tax purposes. Id. It should be noted that the use of the alternate valuation date
may affect the ability of the estate to qualify for this statutory deferral. Similarly, the
availability of the deferral may be affected by a decision to deduct expenses on the income
tax return instead of on the estate tax return. HoCKY, supra note 108, at A-2. Finally, it is
possible that an election to receive § 2032A treatment for a farming operation might result
in a reduction of the adjusted gross estate to an extent that would eliminate the availability
of § 6166.
113. If the business is a sole proprietorship, only the assets actually used in the business
are to be considered in making the determination. If the business is a partnership, the
decedent must have owned at least 20% of the capital interest in a partnership with ten or
fewer partners. If the business is a corporation, the decedent must have owned 20% of the
voting stock in a corporation with ten or fewer shareholders. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(c).
114. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6166(h).
115. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6163(a); see HocKy, supra note 108, at A-11. The amount
eligible for postponement can be found by using this simple formula:
values of remainder or reversionary
amount eligible
interest (minus adjustments)
postponement.
for
=
tax
estate
X
estate
gross
of
value
(minus adjustments)
Under this formula the value of the remainder interest, the reversionary interest, and the
gross estate must be reduced by the amount of claims and losses attributable to the interest,
and by any amount deductible with respect to such interest for a charitable transfer or a
marital deduction. HOCKY, supra note 108, at A-12.
116. S. Rept. to § 811 of Rev. Act of 1932, 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, 535.
117. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6163(b).
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The third major statutory section providing for an extension of
the time for paying the estate tax was found in section 6161. Under
6161(a) (1), the District Director, upon a finding of reasonable cause,
could extend the time for payment of the estate tax for a period not
to exceed twelve months following the original due date.1 8 Further,
under section 6161(a) (2), the District Director could extend the time
for paying the estate tax or one of the section 6166 installments for
a period of ten years."' In order to be eligible for the ten year deferment, the estate had to show that "undue hardship" would result
120
if the deferment was not available.
Under the regulations, "undue hardship" was a more stringent
test than "reasonable cause." Under the "reasonable cause" test a
delay in marshalling the estate's assets would be sufficient. Similarly, if assets were tied up in litigation or were merely rights to
receive money in the future, the reasonable cause test would be
satisfied. 2' On the other hand, a mere showing of inconvenience to
the estate would not satisfy the undue hardship requirement. 2 2 The
precise line of demarcation between the two tests was not entirely
clear. Nonetheless, the regulations indicated that a sale of estate
assets at a sacrifice price would be an undue hardship.2 Likewise,
the sale of a closely held business, not qualifying under section 6166,
to an unrelated person at its fair market value might cause undue
hardship. 2 Thus, even though the estate could not receive a deferment under sections 6163 or 6166, the executor could still obtain an
extension if he satisfied one of the two tests in section 6161.'2
In each of the three statutory deferral sections previously described, the executor was required to pay interest on the unpaid
balance of the estate tax. Prior to July 1, 1975, the interest rate in
these situations was four percent instead of the six percent rate
generally imposed by the Code.'26 Then, on July 1, 1975, section 6621
118. Since the estate tax return is not due until nine months after death, § 6161(a)(1)
effectively allows the payment of the estate tax 21 months after the date of death. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954 § 6161(a)(1).
119. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6161(a)(2).
120. Id.
121. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a) (1958).
122. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(2)(ii) (1958).
123. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(2)(ii), Ex. (2) (1958).
124. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(2)(ii), Ex. (1) (1958).
125.

HocKY, supra note 108, at A-13.

126. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6601(b) provides:
If the time for payment of an amount of tax imposed by chapter 11 is extended as
provided in section 6161(a)(2) or 6166, or if the time for payment of an amount of such
tax is postponed or extended as provided by section 6163, interest shall be paid at the
rate of 4 percent, in lieu of 6 percent as provided in subsection (a).
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became effective. That section increased the general interest rate to
nine percent and eliminated the special rates for the deferral sections.' 27 Thus an executor receiving an extension under sections
6166, 6163, or 6161 was required to pay interest at the rate of nine
percent on the unpaid balance of the estate tax.
The nine percent rate did not last long, however, because of the
provision in section 6621(b) providing for an adjustment of the interest rate. According to that provision, the Secretary was required
to adjust the Code's interest rate every October 15 to an amount
equal to ninety percent of the adjusted prime rate charged by commercial banks.' 28 As authorized by Congress, Revenue Ruling 75487121 set the interest rate, effective as of February 1, 1976, at seven
percent per annum.1 3 This, of course, meant that the interest rate
under the three deferral sections also was seven percent.
(2)

Changes Produced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made significant changes in the
statutory framework under which an executor could defer the payment of the estate tax. One of the most important changes removed
the "undue hardship" standard and substituted a "reasonable
cause" standard for the ten year extension provided in section
6161(a) (2)."'3 This change applies to both the estate tax itself and
127. The Committee Reports to § 6621 indicate that the 6% rate was higher than the
prevailing commercial rate when the 6% rate was originally established. This differential was
supposed to be an incentive to encourage the prompt payment of taxes. When the commercial
rates became higher than the Code rate, taxpayers began to "borrow" tax funds at the low
6% rate. To remedy this situation, and to restore the original purpose of the 6% rate the
Committee approved an increase of the 6% rate to 9%. S. RsP. No. 1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
18-21 (1974). In approving the demise of the special rate for the deferral section, the Committee stated:
[Tihe Committee sees no sound reason to permit some taxpayers to pay interest
at a lower rate than other taxpayers are required to pay on underpayments of tax. Relief
from the hardship of paying taxes in a lump sum should not also mean that the interest
rate should be reduced if payments are made in installments. This is particularly so if a
closely held business owned by an estate, or a business which has recovered an expropriation loss, is or can be earning a significantly higher return on the tax money which it
presently can, in effect, borrow from the Government at 4 percent.
Id. at 19-20.
128. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6621(b), 6621(c).
129. 1975-2 C.B. 488.
130. Id.
131. I.R.C. § 6161(a)(2), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, now provides:
The Secretary may, for reasonablecause, extend the time for payment if(A) any part of the amount determined by the executor as the tax imposed by
chapter 11, or
(B) any part of any installment under section 6166 or 6166A (including any part
of a deficiency prorated to any installment under such section), for a reasonable period
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to any installments under section 6166.132 This change will have the
33
effect of making the estate tax deferments much easier to obtain.
A second and similar change in section 6163 allows a three year
extension beyond the termination of the preceding estate for
"reasonable cause" instead of "undue hardship.' 34 Again, this
should increase the availability of the extension.
Perhaps the most important change made by the 1976 Act deals
with section 6166 and the closely held business. The Tax Reform Act
of 1976 redesignated section "6166" as "6166A" and left the entire
provision intact. In addition, a new deferral section was added as
section "6166." Under the new section, an executor can elect to pay
no tax for the first five years, followed by ten yearly installments.'3
To qualify, the value of the closely held business (or farm) must
exceed sixty-five percent of the adjusted gross estate.' 31 The definition of a closely held business has been expanded to include a family
farm, and the number of partners or shareholders connected with
the business can be as high as fifteen.137 The new section also makes
it easier for multiple business interests to qualify, 38 while restricting
the amount of the business that can be disposed of before the acceleration rules are brought into play.'3 9
As with "old" section 6166, an annual interest payment must
be made on the unpaid balance of the estate tax. Under the new law,
not in excess of 10 years from the date prescribed by section 6151(a) for payment of the
tax (or in the case of an amount referred to in subparagraph (B), if later, not beyond
the date which is 12 months after the due date for the last installment).

(emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. I.R.C. § 6161(b)(2) also substituted the "reasonable cause" standard for the
"undue hardship" standard when an executor obtains a four year extension for the payment

of an estate tax deficiency.
134. I.R.C. § 6163(b).
135. I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1). As with "old" section 6166, only the amount of the tax attributable to the closely held business is eligible for the extension. I.R.C. § 6166(a)(2); see note
110 supra. There is also a new lien procedure available to the executor deferring estate tax
payments under §§ 6166 and 6166A. Under § 6324A an executor can be discharged from

personal liability for the extended tax payments if the appropriate agreements are signed.
136. This threshold requirement is more stringent than that which applies to § 6166A.
The Committee Report explained this change by stating: "On the other hand, your committee
believes that the relatively low percentage thresholds for qualification for the 10-year extension are, for the most part, unnecessary." H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976).

137. I.R.C. § 6166(b)(1), 6166(b)(3). It should also be noted that if the special use
valuation is elected for the estate's farm under § 2032A, this asset will constitute a smaller
percentage of the gross estate. This, in turn, may make the deferral sections unavailable, or
at least reduce the amount of tax eligible for deferral.

138.

I.R.C. § 6166(c).
I.R.C. § 6166(g)(1) provides that a disposition of one-third of the business will
invoke the acceleration rules instead of one-half as is used in § 6166A.
139.
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however, there is a special interest rate of four percent on the estate
tax that is attributable to the first one million dollars of farm or
other closely held business property.'40 The seven percent rate will
continue to apply to amounts in excess of that attributable to the
first million dollars. The committee reports indicate that Congress
reinstated the low interest rate because of its belief that many businesses are not profitable enough to pay both the estate tax and a
high rate of interest."'
The changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 make it much
easier for an estate to qualify under the statutory sections providing
extensions for the payment of the estate tax. In addition, "new"
section 6166 is an especially attractive alternative because of its low
interest rate and long deferral period. If the executor can qualify
under its more rigid requirements, the estate can benefit greatly
from the increased extension of the time for paying the tax while
continuing to operate the closely held business.
C.

The Deductibility of Interest Paid on Commercial Loans or
Under the Statutory Deferral Sections

In Revenue Ruling 75-239, 42 one thousand shares of stock in a
closely held business were included in the decedent's gross estate.
One-half of the estate tax liability was attributable to the stock. The
executor filed an election to pay this one-half of the tax in ten
installments under section 6166. Following the election, the executor attempted to deduct the amounts paid in interest on the unpaid
balance as an administration expense under section 2053.143 Thus
the issue presented in Revenue Ruling 75-239 was whether interest
payments by an executor electing to pay the estate tax in installments under section 6166(a) of the Code are deductibile as an administration expense under section 2053(a)(2).
140. I.R.C. § 6601().
141. The Committee reported:
Allowing the reduced interest rate at a 4 percent level for a limited amount of tax
is intended to reflect the problems that smaller businesses have in generating enough
income and cash flow to pay interest at a normal rate and amortize the principal amount
of the estate tax liability. It is felt that the 5-year deferral period plus the reduced
interest rate on the tax attributable to the first $1 million in value of a closely held
business should, in most cases, give the business time to generate sufficient funds to pay
the estate tax and interest thereon without the business having to be sold to satisfy the
estate tax liability (including a period for adjustment after the loss of one of the principal
owners).
H.R. REp. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976).
142. 1975-1 C.B. 304.
143. Id.

1977]

SECTION 2053 DEDUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service held in Revenue Ruling 75-239
that the interest expense was not deductible as an administration
expense under section 2053. In order to justify this position, the
Service cited section 6601(f)(1)'" for the rule that interest paid
under 6161(a)(2), 6163, or 6166111 is to be treated as "assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes."' 4 Having found the
"interest" to be treated as part of the "tax," the Service went on to
say that there is no provision for the deduction of federal estate or
state inheritance taxes 4 7 and, accordingly, disallowed the executor's
claimed deduction.
In support of its holding, the Service relied primarily on two
authorities. First, it cited Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-3 for
the proposition that unpaid income and gift taxes of the decedent
could be deducted, but federal estate taxes could not. That regulation does not really express a position regarding the deductibility of
estate taxes. Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-6(c) does, however, state that "no estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance tax
payable by reason of the decedent's death is deductible.
.";45 thus
the Service's position as to the nondeductibility of federal estate
taxes is supported by the regulations.
The second authority relied upon by the Service was the Seventh Circuit case of Ballance v. United States."I In Ballance the
executor elected to pay the estate tax in installments as allowed
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.'11 The
executor paid the Service $24,897 in interest because of the installment election 5 ' and attempted to deduct this amount as an admin144. I.R.C. § 6601(f)(1) (unchanged by the Tax Reform Act of 1976) provides:
Interest prescribed under this section on any tax shall be paid upon notibe and
demand, and shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes. Any
reference in this title (except subchapter B or chapter 63, relating to deficiency procedures) to any tax imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to interest imposed
by this section on such tax.
145. I.R.C. § 6601(b) states that § 6601 is the governing section of the Code for interest
imposed under §§ 6161(a)(2), 6163, and 6166. This is unchanged by the Tax Reform Act of
1976, and, in addition, "new" § 6166(f)(2) apparently intends to treat the 15 year deferral
provision in the same manner.
146. I.R.C. § 6601(f)(1).
147. Rev. Rul. 75-239, 1975-1 C.B. 304.
148. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(c) (1958).
149. 347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
150. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 890, 891.
151. Interest of $24,897 was paid as a result of the installment payments of the estate
tax. The installment method was available because the sale of the leasehold and partnership
interest in oil properties (comprising the bulk of the estate's assets) could not be accomplished except at a sacrifice. 347 F.2d at 420.
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istration expense." The Seventh Circuit disallowed the deduction.
The court found local law allowing the deduction of federal estate
taxes for state inheritance tax purposes irrelevant, deeming the
"local law" provision of the 1939 counterpart to section 2053 subservient to the more specific deferral sections that treated the interest
as part of the tax.' 3 The court then found "no basis for imputing to
Congress a concomitant intent that the general provision relating to
administration expenses was to afford an avenue through which the
amount of the tax itself was to be reduced because of the interest
exacted for the delay in its payment (emphasis added)."'54 As can
be seen, this is precisely the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 75-239,
and, accordingly, the ruling is solidly supported by the Ballance
case.
It is important to note that the Service's Revenue Ruling distinguished the cases of James S. Todd,'55 and Hipp v. United States.'"
In both of these cases the executor found that the estate did not
contain sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate tax. To meet this
problem, the executors obtained loans from private lenders, paid
the estate tax,'57 and attempted to deduct the interest expenses as
administration expenses under section 2053(a) (2). In both cases the
deduction was allowed. The Hipp court (and the Service in Revenue
Ruling 75-239)1'" distinguished these factual situations from the
Ballance case because the private loans did not extend the time for
payment of the estate taxes under the statutory provisions. This
meant that the government was not deprived of its money for any
' 59
period of time, and the interest was not really part of the "tax.'
Thus the executor could deduct the interest.
152. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(b)(2).
153. 347 F.2d at 421.
154. Id.
155. 57 T.C. 288 (1971), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
156. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,824 (D.S.C. 1971).
157. In Todd the executor borrowed $300,000 from the decedent's cattle company at
6.25% per annum. The loan was required to pay the estate tax because the estate did not
possess any liquid assets, and the sale of the nonliquid assets would have been at "forced sale"
prices. When the loan was repaid, $31,927 in interest had accrued and was paid to the cattle
company. Some of this amount was deducted on the fiduciary's income tax return, and the
remainder ($23,013.80) was sought as a deduction on the estate tax return under § 2053. 57
T.C. at 292.
In Hipp the decedent's estate was valued at $723,693 of which $617,975 consisted of stock
in a life insurance company. Because the stock was a "thin-market" stock, the executor
believed a sale of the stock would drive the market price down. To avoid this, a loan was
obtained to pay the estate tax, and $24,211 in interest was paid on the loan. This is the
amount the executor sought to deduct under § 2053. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,678.
158. 1975-1 C.B. at 306.
159. 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. at 84,680.
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The Revenue Ruling, Ballance, Todd, and Hipp teach that interest paid to a private lender on a loan to pay the estate tax is
deductible but interest paid to the government under the statutory
deferral sections is not deductible. Obtaining a deduction for the
interest paid on a private loan, however, is not quite that simple.
In both Todd and Hipp the court required the estate to comply with
the regulations under section 2053 in order to obtain the deduction.
This meant that the expense had to be "allowable" under local law
and the expense had to be "necessary." In each case the court found
that the illiquidity of the estate, coupled with the probability of a
sacrifice sale, justified a finding that the expense was necessary. 60
In contrast, the court in Hibernia Bank v. United States' found
that the interest payments were not "necessary," because the executor could have sold some of the estate's assets at their fair market
value in order to pay the tax. Consequently, the deduction was
disallowed. 612 Therefore, even if the interest is paid to a private
lender instead of the Service, an executor should be careful to comply with the regulations under section 2053 (to the extent they are
valid),' as well as making sure that the deduction is allowable
under local law. 6 4
D.

Criticism and Comment

An analysis of the authorities relied upon in Revenue Ruling 75239 reveals that the Internal Revenue Service is probably correct in
denying a deduction for the interest payments incurred under the
statutory deferral sections. Both the Service's statutory interpretations and the case law compel a disallowance of the deduction.'65
Nevertheless, the Todd and Hipp cases were correctly decided. Re160. In Todd the court found that the Texas Probate Code allowed the executor to
borrow funds to pay for the estate tax. 57 T.C. at 295-96. The fact that a sale of the estate's
assets would have resulted in "reduced prices" made the sale "necessary." Id. at 296.
In Hipp the court found that the expense was allowable under South Carolina law, and
was in fact allowed by the probate court. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,678. The court also found
"that it was necessary to acquire funds to pay the estate tax liabilities without sacrificing
the assets of the estate." Id. at 84,680.
161. 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 13,102 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
162. In Hibernia the California probate court had approved interest payments totaling
$196,210. The district court found the interest payments to be unnecessary because the
executor could have sold bank stock to raise the cash, or he could have distributed the
unprofitable real estate in kind. 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,901.
163. See section II of this Note for a discussion of the validity of the Treasury Regulations applicable to § 2053.
164. See Maehling v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,486 (S.D. Ind. 1967); cf.
Estate of Webster, 65 T.C. 968 (1976).
165. See notes 148-54 supra and accompanying text.
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call that in those cases the courts allowed the deduction because the
Treasury was not being deprived of money that "rightly belonged"
to the Treasury."'5 Viewing all of these cases together, a curious fact
becomes immediately apparent: whether the estate obtains a private loan or utilizes the statutory deferral sections, it is required to
pay interest for the privilege of paying its tax obligation in yearly
installments. Yet under the private loan situation, the executor can
receive a large section 2053 deduction for the interest payment and
thereby reduce the amount of the tax he is required to pay." 7 Therefore, even if the estate can qualify for a deferral under the Code, it
may be cheaper for the executor to forego a utilization of the statutory provisions and obtain a commercial loan instead.
The economic advantages of obtaining a private loan can be
illustrated by the following example."' 8 Assume a gross estate in 1981
166. See notes 155-59 supra and accompanying text.
167. Id.
168. The calculations for the example are as follows:
Calculations using
a private loan
with interest at 8%

Calculations under
the deferral sections
with interest at 7%
2,000,000
(without int. 200,000
deduction) 1,800,000
900,000
900,000
306,800
47,000
259,800

2,000,000
246,760 (with interest
1,753,240 deduction)
876,620
876,620
297,681
47,000
250,681

Gross estate
§§ 2053, 2054 Deductions
Adjusted gross estate
Marital deduction
Taxable estate
Tentative Tax
Unified Credit
TAX DUE

1,000,000 (value of closely
held business)
x 259,800 (tax) = 129,900 (amount
2,000,000 (gross estate)
eligible for
deferment)

(Payments)
[deferral sections]
(non-deferrable
portion of tax)
129,900

(installment)
+ 12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990

[private loan]

(interest)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

8,183
7,274
6,365
5,455
4,546
3,637
2,727
1,818
909
0
40,914

-Year

1-2-3-4-5-

(non-deferrable
portion of tax)

(installment)

(innterest)

129,900

F 12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990
12,990

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

-7-- 8-9--10-... Total Interest Paynments
259,800
40,914

Tax Paid
Interest Paid

300,714

Total Expenditures
300,714
297,441

9,352
8,313
7,274
6,235
5,196
4,156
3,117
2,076
1,039
0
46,760

250,681
46,760
297,441

Expenditures under code provisions
Expenditures using private loan

3,273 Savings
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of $2,000,000 with section 2053 and section 2054 deductions of
$200,000 (not including a deduction for the interest expense). In this
situation the adjusted gross estate is $1,800,000. Assuming the maximum marital deduction, the taxable estate is $900,000.
Further assume that the gross estate includes a qualifying
closely held business or unmarketable assets worth $1,000,000. The
estate therefore probably would qualify for the statutory deferral
under either section 6161 or section 6166A, but not section 6166.69
If no gifts were made by the decedent, the tax payable, after
the subtraction of the unified credit,'7 0 would be $259,800. Of this
amount, $129,900 could be deferred in ten yearly installments of
$12,990. At the current seven percent rate applicable to sections
6166A and 6161, the executor would pay $40,914 in interest over the
ten year deferral period. Adding this figure to the estate tax, the
expenditures of the executor would equal $300,714.
Now assume that instead of proceeding under the statutory
deferral sections the executor obtained an eight percent commercial
loan."' If the amount obtained from the loan was the same as the
amount deferred under the statutory sections, the executor would
pay $46,760 in interest over ten years. In addition, the interest payments would be deductible under section 2053 as an administration
expense, and the taxable estate would be $876,620. The estate tax
on this amount would be $250,681. Adding the estate tax and the
interest, the total expenditures would equal $297,441-$3,273 less
than the amount expended by taking advantage of the deferral provisions in the Code.
Further comments on the above example are appropriate. First,
note that over $3,000 is saved by procuring a private loan. Secondly,
this saving occurs regardless of whether the loan can meet the requirements for qualification under the Code. Additionally, the es169. Value of closely held business

$1,000,000

35% of gross estate

$ 700,000

50% of taxable estate

$ 450,000

$1,170,000
65c% of adjusted gross estate
170. See I.R.C. § 2010.
171. It must be noted that a bank loan may not be available to many estates whose
major asset is stock in a closely held business because such stock may be considered poor
collateral. Lewis & Barcal, Estate Planning for Closely Held Business Interests, 1976
U.S.C.L. CENTER, TAx INsT. 117, 180. Especially in those situations it may be wise for the

executor to consider using a § 303 redemption in connection with a deferral of the estate tax
under § 6166 or § 6166A. See Rosen, New Tax Savings Opportunities in Post-Mortem Planning Provided by Tax Reform Act of 1976, 1977 TAx. FOR LAw. 202, 205-06.
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tate planner and decedent are not burdened with pre-mortem planning in order to insure that the estate qualifies under the Code.'7
Thirdly, observe that the savings are actually greater than the example indicates. Since the estate tax is reduced, the executor might
not need to borrow as much as $129,900. If he does not, the interest
payments will be less (as will the deduction). If he does, he will have
more cash available for other purposes.
It should be noted that the profitability of the commercial loan
depends in large part upon the interest rate charged by the private
lender. If the rate is significantly higher than the statutory rate (two
points or more in the example), the deferral provisions of the Code
probably will be cheaper. The four percent rate charged under
"new" section 6166 will probably be more advantageous than any
commercial loan likely to be available, but the stringent requirements for qualification under this section may make the provision
unavailable.
One final factor also must be considered. It is likely that many
executors may attempt to take a deduction for the interest expense
on the fiduciary's income tax return. While Revenue Ruling 75-239
is restricted to an estate tax deduction, 73 it remains unlikely that
the interest expense would be a valid income tax deduction. In
arriving at this conclusion a three step analysis is appropriate. First,
the Ballance case and the Revenue Ruling dictate that interest
under the statutory deferral sections is part of the tax.' Secondly,
it should be observed that income tax deductions for an estate are
generally the same as those deductions available to an individual.,
Finally, it is clear that individuals are generally prohibited from
taking an income tax deduction for estate taxes.'75 Following this
analysis, it is unlikely that an interest expense can properly be
77
deducted on the fiduciary's income tax return.'
In conclusion, the executor should consider the possibility of
securing a private loan instead of opting for the Code provisions
providing a deferral of the time for paying the estate tax. The executor and the decedent will not be burdened by pre-death adjustments
to the business and the estate in order to insure compliance with the
172. See note 112 supra.
173. 1975-1 C.B. at 306.
174. See notes 145-47 supra and accompanying text.
175. 3 FED. TAXES (P-H) 28,000.
176. I.R.C. § 275(a)(3); see L.B. Foster Co. v. United States, 248 F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir.
1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-2(c) (1960); 2 FED. TAxEs (P-H) 13,202.
177. Contra Lewis & Barcal, Estate Planningfor Closely Held Business Interests, 1976
U.S.C.L. CENTEA
Trx INST. 117, 183.
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statutory requirements. Additionally, there may be a significant tax
savings. A possible detrimental aspect of this procedure may be the
judicially-imposed requirement that the interest expense be necessary. This will probably not be a major obstacle because the executor will seldom consider deferring the estate tax if the interest expense is not "necessary" as required by the regulations. Finally, if
the estate can meet the requirements of "new" section 6166, its four
percent interest rate probably will make that statutory provision
more attractive than any other procedure. In all other cases the
executor would be wise to consider the private loan alternative.

IV.

THE DEDUCTIBILITY UNDER SECTION

2053

OF VALID CLAIMS

AGAINST THE ESTATE NOT FILED IN THE PROBATE COURT

A.

Introduction

Section 2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows claims
against the estate to be deducted from the decedent's gross estate
in determining the taxable estate. 7 ' This deduction is allowed in
order to ensure that only the property actually passing at death will
be taxed.' 7' Section 2053(a) requires only that the claim be allowable
under local law. Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-4 further limits the deduction to claims that are enforceable under the laws of
the jurisdiction where the estate is being administered. 'so Neither
the Code nor the regulations indicate what effect events after the
decedent's death should have on the deductibility of claims against
the decedent's death.'"' Specifically, they do not address the question whether a deduction can be obtained when an executor pays a
claim informally presented to him, even though local law requires
that the creditor file his claim in the probate court. In 1975, the
Internal Revenue Service issued two Revenue Rulings holding that
178.

I.R.C. § 2053(a) is set forth in note 3 supra.

179.
180.

Kahn v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958) provides in part:

Only claims enforceable against the decedent's estate may be deducted. Except as
otherwise provided in § 20.2053-5 with respect to pledges or subscriptions, section
2053(c)(1)(A) provides that the allowance of a deduction for a claim founded upon a
promise or agreement is limited to the extent that the liability was contracted bona fide
and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth ....
181. For a discussion of the effect of post-mortem occurrences on probate administra-

tion, see Note, FederalEstate Taxation:Recent Developments in the Deductibilityof Claims
Against the Decedent's Estate and Their Effect in Illinois, 52 CHi.-KEN' L. REv. 664 (1976);
Comment, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent to
Death, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 654 (1975); Comment, Effect of Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on the Valuationof ClaimsAgainst His Estate UnderSection 2053 of the Federal
Estate Tax, 1972 U. hL. L.F. 770; 10 WmK FoREST L. REv. 328 (1974).
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a deduction will be disallowed under these circumstances.'82 This
portion of the note will examine these Rulings and the cases pertinent to the issue the Rulings purport to decide. The implications of
the Rulings will be considered under the Uniform Probate Code and
in a jurisdiction such as Tennessee where creditors are required to
file their claims in the probate court. Finally, recommendations will
be suggested for the executor confronted with these problems.
B. The Revenue Rulings and Their Ramifications
In Revenue Ruling 75-24, the decedent, a Mississippi resident,
died owing an unsecured debt. Three months after the decedent's
death, the creditor asserted his claim against the executor. The
executor paid the debt with the approval of the beneficiaries and
deducted the claim on the estate tax return.' Because section
2053(a) provides deductions only for those claims that are allowable
under local law,'84 the Internal Revenue Service felt obligated to
examine the applicable Mississippi law in order to determine
whether the amount expended to satisfy the debt was deductible.
Under the Mississippi Code, a fiduciary is prohibited from paying
any claim that has not been filed in and allowed by the probate
court.' 5 Nonetheless, in Townsend v. Beavers,'8' the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that an executor could not be surcharged for
paying a valid but unfiled claim when the distributees of the estate
had consented to the payment.'87 According to the Service, this case
meant that in Mississippi the payment of the unfiled claim in the
Revenue Ruling was "allowable," and therefore deductible despite
the statutory filing requirement.'88
Revenue Ruling 75-177"1 presented a similar factual situation.
An unsecured creditor of the decedent informally presented his
claim to the executor instead of filing his claim in the Florida probate court. With the consent of the beneficiaries, the claim was paid
and a deduction was taken for the amount of the debt on the federal
estate tax return. Again the Service considered the local law of
probate administration."10 As in Mississippi, the Florida Code re182.
183.
184.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975-1 C.B. 306; Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975-1 C.B. 307.
1975-1 C.B. at 306.
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-151 (1972).
185 Miss. 312, 188 So. 1 (1939).
1975-1 C.B. at 306.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
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quired creditors to file all claims in the probate court within six
months from the date the notice to creditors was first published."'
Unlike the Mississippi court, however, the Florida Supreme Court
had stated clearly that the filing of the claim could not be waived
regardless of whether the beneficiaries had approved the payment. 9 2
Thus, in the case considered in the Revenue Ruling, the claim was
not "allowable" and therefore could not be deducted. The Service
did concede, however, that an exception would be made if the creditor was also the sole beneficiary of the estate.'9 3
If the position of the Revenue Rulings is sustained by the
courts, an executor administering an estate in a jurisdiction requiring the filing of claims will face many severe problems. If the executor pays the claim without requiring a filing in the probate court,
he may subject himself to personal liability.'9 4 If the executor pays
the claim without obtaining a corresponding estate tax deduction,
he has caused a reduction in the amount of property available for
distribution to the beneficiaries without decreasing the amount of
the estate tax. In addition, if the claim is later determined to be void
because of the creditor's failure to file, the service might consider
the cancellation of the obligation as a receipt of income, thereby
causing an increase in the income taxes as well.'95 Should these
results obtain, a beneficiary probably would be successful in a suit
to surcharge the executor.
Other problems created by an application of the position set
forth in the Revenue Rulings are simply those of time and expense.
If obviously valid claims are required to be filed in order to obtain
the estate tax deduction, the executor will have to force all creditors
to go to the time, expense, and trouble to file their claims. This, in
191. At the time letters testamentary were issued, the Florida Code absolutely required
a filing of all claims. FIA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (West 1965). Less than four months later the
Florida statute was amended to allow the executor to pay unfiled claims with the consent of
all the beneficiaries so long as the claim was presented informally to the executor within the
regular statutory time period for filing. The Service stated that if this law had been in effect
at the time the letters were issued, the deduction would have been allowed as in Rev. Rul.
75-24. 1975-1 C.B. at 307.
192. Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970).
193. This concession was given in both the Revenue Rulings. See, e.g., Howells v. Fox,
251 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1957).
194. See, e.g., the personal liability provisions of Florida and Mississippi as discussed
in the Revenue Rulings considered at note 182 supra.
195. The recent cases of Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C. 465 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 492
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974), and Estate of Bankhead, 60 T.C. 535 (1973), may compel this result.
For a discussion of this specific effect of a creditor's failure to file his claim, see Comment,
Estate and Income Tax: ClaimsAgainst the Estate and Events Subsequent to Date of Death,
22 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 654, 657 (1975); 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 328, 333 (1974).
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turn, will place an increased burden on the state probate courts. The
filing requirement also will create an unnecessary delay in the payment of the decedent's debts. Creditors will be forced to await approval by the probate court, and this may be a considerable length
of time, depending on the extent of the congestion caused in the
courts by the filing requirement. ' Further, the executor will be left
with no discretion. Instead, he will be forced to insure that every
valid and bona fide obligation is brought to the probate court's
attention where it probably will receive only perfunctory attention.
Because of the severe consequences of the Revenue Rulings, the
following subsection considers their validity.
C. The Case Law
Under section 2053, an executor can obtain a deduction for
claims against the decedent's estate if they are "allowable" under
local law. In addition, the regulations require that the claims be
"enforceable" against the estate.'97 The unanswered question is
when must the allowability or the enforceability of the claim be
determined. If determined as of the decedent's death, valid obligations of the decedent are clearly allowable and enforceable regardless of whether they are later filed in the probate court. From this
perspective, all valid claims paid by the executor existing at the
decedent's death should be deductible. On the other hand, if the
actual events occurring after the decedent's death are considered,
the deduction should not be permitted. This would happen when a
creditor failed to file his claim in the probate court as required by
statute. In that event the claim would become void, and therefore
not allowable or enforceable by the probate court. Hence the deduction would not be available.'98
Both of the theories discussed above have considerable support
in the case law. The leading case prohibiting a consideration of
events occurring after the decedent's death is Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States.99 In Ithaca Trust the decedent left the residue of his
estate to his wife for life with the remainder in trust to charity. The
decedent's wife died six months after the decedent and before the
196. At least one writer has stated that the delay caused by a filing requirement should
not be too burdensome in view of the delay generally encountered in the processing of the
estate tax return. 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rlv. 625, 639 (1974).

197. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
198. See Note, supra note 181, at 665; Comment, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv., supra note 181,
at 672; Comment, 1972 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 181, at 776-77.
199. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
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filing of the estate tax return. In determining the amount of the
charitable contribution deduction, the executor sought to deduct an
amount equal to the value of the property less the value of the six
months interest of the wife. The government, on the other hand,
attempted to decrease the amount of the charitable deduction by
arguing that the deduction must be determined by subtracting
(from the value of the property) an amount equal to the value of the
wife's life interest as determined by her life expectancy at the decedent's death.2 01 Since her life expectancy was more than the six
months she actually lived, the value of the charitable deduction
would be less if the statistical probability method advocated by the
government was used instead of the actual time of her survivorship.
The United States Supreme Court held for the government. According to Justice Holmes, the estate should be settled as of the date of
the decedent's death. 20 1 Thus, under Ithaca Trust, post mortem
events probably should not be considered in determining deductions
provided by the Code.
Only six months after Ithaca Trust, the Eighth Circuit held
that events subsequent to death could be considered in determining
the deductibility of a claim against the estate. In Jacobs v.
Commissioner,02 the decedent had entered into an antenuptial contract with his wife providing that she would be paid $75,000 out of
his estate if she would surrender her dower and other marital rights.
Under the will, however, the widow was given the option of receiving
a life income interest in $250,000 instead of the $75,000 bequest. The
widow elected to receive the income interest, but the executors still
attempted to deduct $75,000 on the theory that the wife had a valid
claim for this amount at the date of the decedent's death. In resolving this question, the court distinguished Ithaca Trust on the
grounds that it involved a charitable bequest rather than a deduction for a claim against the decedent's estate.2 3 The court disal200. Id.
201. Justice Holmes stated:
The question is whether the amount of the diminution, that is, the length of the postponement, is to be determined by the event as it turned out, of the widow's death within
six months, or by the mortality tables showing the probabilities as they stood on the day
when the testator died. The first impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical
probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. The estate
so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator's death. . . . The tax is on the
act of the testator not on the receipt of property by the legatees. . . . Therefore, the
value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done.
Id. at 155.
202. 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929).
203. 34 F.2d at 236.
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lowed the deduction by noting that the deduction for claims against
the estate was grouped with the deductions for funeral and administration expenses." 4 Since the amount of these deductions could be
ascertained only after the decedent's death, the court thought that
post death events could also be considered in determining the deductibility of claims against the estate. The court also stated that
that were
Congress did not intend to provide a deduction for claims
2
never paid. Accordingly, the deduction was disallowed. 11
In the cases subsequent to Ithaca Trust and Jacobs, the courts
have been unable to agree whether post mortem events (e.g., a
creditor's failure to file his claim in the probate court) can be considered in passing on the deductibility of a claim against the decedent's estate under section 2053. Until 1957, the courts were usually
persuaded by the Jacobs rationale. 26 Then, in Winer v. United
States, 2 7 the court resurrected the Ithaca Trust decision when a
claim became unenforceable due to an inadvertant failure to file the
claim in the probate court. Citing Ithaca Trust, the court sustained
the deduction because the claim was allowable and enforceable2 8 at
the time of the decedent's death.2 0 In 1958, the Tax Court also
but was reversed by the Second Circuit in
followed Ithaca Trust,
2 10
Shively.
of
Estate
Because of the Winer decision, the Internal Revenue Service
issued Revenue Ruling 60-247.211 In that Ruling, the Service rejected
Winer by asserting the validity of the Jacobs opinion. In holding
that a creditor's failure to file his claim will bar the deduction, t 2 the
204. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403(2)(1), 42 Stat. 279 (now I.R.C. § 2053).
205. 34 F.2d at 236.
206. See, e.g., Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942);
Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934); Estate of Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153 (1946). See also
Note, supra note 181, at 669; Comment, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv., supra note 181, at 674; Comment, 1972 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 181, at 778. But see Estate of Wittman, 1952 T.C.M. (PH) 52,202.
207. 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
208. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
209. 153 F. Supp. at 943-44.
210. 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 965 (1958), rev'd, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). In Shively a
deduction was claimed for periodic alimony payments. Although the payments were terminated upon the widow's remarriage, the Tax Court still applied Ithaca Trust because the
possibility of remarriage had been considered in the actuarial valuation of the claim. 17
T.C.M. at 967-68. The Second Circuit disagreed, stating that the estate could obtain "no
greater deduction than the established sum, irrespective of whether this amount is established through events occurring before or after the decedent's death." 276 F.2d at 375.
211. 1960-2 C.B. 272.
212. In its holding the Service stated:
[N]o deduction will be allowed for claims against the estate which have not been paid
or will not be paid because the creditor waives payment, fails to file his claim within
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Service entirely omitted a discussion of Ithaca Trust.
Shortly after the Service's 1960 Revenue Ruling, the Tax Court
decided to follow Jacobs in Estate of Shedd.1 3 In 1966, however, a
district court in Illinois again rejected Jacobs and the holding of
Revenue Ruling 60-247. In Russell v. United States,2t 1 the decedent's husband left his children a great deal of stock in a trust to
be administered by his wife. During her life, the decedent/trustee
sold the assets and commingled the proceeds with her own funds.
The children did not learn of the trust until twenty-three months
after issuance of letters testamentary to the executor of their
mother's estate. At this time they brought an action in the probate
court to recover the funds belonging to them under the terms of the
trust.21 5 Despite the requirement in Illinois that all claims against
the estate be filed within nine months of notice to creditors, 26 the
probate court approved the beneficiaries' claim. Thereafter, the executor took an estate tax deduction for the amount paid to the
children. In approving the deduction, the district court specifically
rejected Revenue Ruling 60-247 and found that the word
"allowable," as used in section 2053, referred to that instant immediately following the decedent's death. The subsequent event of the
27
creditors' failure to file their claim was irrelevant. 1
In 1972 and 1973 the Tax Court continued the two conflicting
lines of authority when it decided the cases of Estate of Lester28 and
Estate of Hagmann.216 In Lester, the executor wanted a deduction
for the full amount of the purchase price of the annuity he bought
to satisfy the decedent's alimony obligation. 220 In a strange reversal
of roles, the government contended that the amount of the deduction should be determined according to the value of the debt at the
decedent's death."' In upholding the Commissioner, the court
the time limit and under the conditions prescribed by the applicable local law, or
otherwise fails to enforce payments.
Id. at 274.
213. 37 T.C. 394 (1961). In returning to the Jacobs approach, the court stated that
Congress intended to allow a deduction only for those claims actually paid or to be paid. Id.
at 397.
214. 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
215. Id. at 496.
216. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 3, § 204 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
217. 260 F. Supp. at 499.
218. 57 T.C. 503 (1972).
219. 60 T.C. 465 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
220. 57 T.C. at 506.
221. The position taken by the Commissioner was unusual because an event subsequent
to death (e.g., failure to file a claim) normally will serve to reduce the amount of the deduction. In Lester, however, the purchase of the annuity subsequent to death would increase the
deduction.
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adopted the position of Ithaca Trust22and ignored events occurring
subsequent to the decedent's death.
In Hagmann the executor deducted debts that were valid
claims against the decedent's estate. The Commissioner argued that
the claims were not allowable or deductible because they were not
filed in the probate court as required under Florida law.22 3 The executor responded that the claims were allowable at the time of the
decedent's death and they were deductible under Ithaca Trust. This
time the Tax Court rejected the Ithaca Trust rationale and held for
the government. The court rejected Russell and Winer, and stated
that Congress intended to tax only the net estate passing to the
beneficiaries. In order to effectuate that purpose, it was necessary
22
to consider post-death events. 1
In the five years since Hagmann and Lester, the Tax Court
apparently has settled on a position approving Jacobs instead of
Ithaca Trust. In Estate of Courtney,2 5 the court stated that "events
occurring after the decedent's death must be considered in determining the deductibility of claims under section 2053(a) (3) ."21, This
position was reiterated in the memorandum decision of Estate of
Conard.22 7 In that case the court specifically approved the Jacobs
decision because Congress did not intend to allow a deduction for
"theoretical" claims. Another memorandum decision, Ehret v.
Commissioner,22 also approved Jacobs. The court in Ehret clearly
stated that the deduction for the payment of the creditor's claim
could not be allowed because it was not filed within seven months
2
as required under the law of Illinois. 11
The most recent Tax Court case in this area and the only one
actually to consider the validity of the 1975 Revenue Rulings, is
Estate of Gosch.2 30 The facts in Gosch were almost identical to those
222. 57 T.C. at 507.
223. See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text.
224. 60 T.C. at 469.
225. 62 T.C. 317 (1974).
226. Id. at 322. Under similar facts the same result was reached in Estate of Fawcett,
64 T.C. 889 (1975).
227. 1975 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,249.
228. 1976 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,315.
229. The court relied heavily on Hagmann, stating:
We have held under Florida law that where no claims were filed with respect to certain
debts of decedent within the statutory period and the claims have not and will not be
paid by the estate, such claims are not deductible under section 2053(a)(3). . . . Here
under the applicable Illinois law claims not filed in the probate proceeding within seven
months of the issuance of letters testamentary are barred as to the estate assets which
have been inventoried during that seven month period.
230.

1976 T.C.M. (P-H)

76,082.
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considered in Revenue Ruling 75-177.21 The executors paid a claim
that was informally presented to them without requiring the creditor to file her claim with the Florida probate court. In disallowing
the deduction, the court reluctantly relied on and approved the 1975
Revenue Rulings:
Although the result may appear to be harsh in this case, we can find no
escape from it in view of the Florida statute and the authoritative interpretation of it by the Supreme Court of that state. Our holding is, of course, limited
to those estates the administration of which began prior to October 1, 1973. A
result could be reached in cases governed by the
different and more reasonable
12
later statutory provisions.2

Finally, the case of Estate of Chesterton v. United States233
represents the latest Court of Claims decision in this area. In that
case the court clearly adopted the Jacobs rationale by allowing postdeath events to be considered in ascertaining the appropriate
amount of an estate tax deduction for alimony expenditures.2 3 An
examination of the cases indicates that neither Jacobs nor Ithaca
Trust have become controlling on the question whether events subsequent to the decedent's death can be deducted under section 2053.
More specifically, it is still unsettled whether an executor can obtain a deduction for a claim against the estate if the creditor has not
filed his claim in the local probate court, nor does it appear that the
Service's position in the 1975 Revenue Rulings is entirely consistent
with the existing case law. It does seem, however, that both the Tax
Court and the Court of Claims recently have approved the position
of the Commissioner. 21 Accordingly, an executor who intends to
litigate the issue should probably pay the tax and sue for a refund
in the district court. Of course litigating the issue probably presents
a more onerous burden than simply refusing to pay a claim that is
not filed in the probate court. As discussed earlier, numerous problems and inconveniences will stem from such a decision, but many
of these negative effects will befall the court and creditors instead
of the executor.2n Thus, even though the Revenue Rulings may not
be valid, the pragmatics of the situation probably compel compliance with the Rulings by the executor.
231.

See notes 189-93 supra and accompanying text.

232. 1976 T.C.M. (P-H) at 76-349.
233. 3 FED. EST. & GiFrt TAXEs (P-H)

148,145 (Ct. Cl. March 23, 1977).
234. Id.
235. See notes 224-34 supra and accompanying text.

236. See notes 194-96 supra and accompanying text.
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D. The Effect of the Revenue Rulings in Tennessee and in
JurisdictionsWhere the Uniform Probate Code Has Been Adopted
Like most probate administration statutes, the Uniform Probate Code requires the executor or personal representative to inventory the assets of the estate2s? and publish a notice to creditors in a
newspaper of general circulation. 23s Under the scheme of the Uniform Probate Code, all claims against the decedent's estate must be
"presented" to the executor within four months of the notice to
creditors (or within three years of death if no notice was given) or
be forever barred. 23 Although the Uniform Probate Code contains a
"non-claim" provision similar to those in many states, 40 it possesses
a unique feature in section 3-804. Under that section,
"presentment" of the claim is accomplished by either a written
notice to the personal representative or filing in the probate court. 24 '
In fact, the comments indicate that the probate court will act
merely as a depository with most claims being presented personally
to the executor. 42 Although the executor may be personally liable if
he pays a claim without requiring presentment, 43 this procedure
promotes the prompt and efficient settlement of estates.
In a jurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform Probate Code,
it is likely that the 1975 Revenue Rulings will have little effect
because the Uniform Probate Code does not require a filing in the
probate court. Instead, only presentment is necessary. Under the
Revenue Rulings, if the state law does not require a filing of the
claims, a deduction can be obtained if the executor simply follows
the procedure mandated by the state statute. 44' Thus, in a Uniform
237. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-706.
238. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-801.
239. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a) provides in part:
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent
• . . are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) within 4 months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors if
notice is given in compliance with Section 3-801 ....
(2) within [3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not
been published.
240. See, e.g., note 247 infra.
241. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-804 provides in part:
Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented as follows:
(1) the claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative a written
statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written statement of the claim, in
the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the Court. ...
242. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-804, Official Comment.
243. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, art. III, pt. 8, Official General Comment.
244. Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975-1 C.B. 306; Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975-1 C.B. 307, 308.
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Probate Code jurisdiction, if the executor paid a valid claim that
was not filed, he could still deduct the payment to the creditor on
the federal estate tax return.
In Tennessee, Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) section 30509 requires the clerk of the court to provide newspaper notice to
creditors of the decedent's estate245 to alert them of the need to file
their claims against the estate with the probate court. Under
T.C.A. section 30-510, creditors have six months from the date
notice was first given to file their claims along with an affidavit
asserting the genuineness of the claim.246 If the creditor fails to file
his claim in the county probate court within the specified time
period, his claim is forever barred under T.C.A. section 30-513.247
The only exception to this requirement is T.C.A. section 30-514
which allows the personal representative to waive the filing require2 48
ment for claims less than 100 dollars.
Under the statutory framework set forth in the Tennessee Code,
it is quite possible that the 1975 Revenue Rulings will have a serious
effect on Tennessee executors. Since Tennessee procedure is quite
similar to Florida procedure,249 it is likely that the Internal Revenue
Service will eventually impose the rule of Revenue Ruling 75-177 in
Tennessee. Recall that this Ruling disallowed a deduction for the
payment of an informally presented claim against the estate because the Florida statute absolutely required all claims to be filed
in the probate court. Since the Florida and Tennessee statutes are
so similar, it is likely that the burdensome filing requirement will
245. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-509 requires the first of two weekly notices to be published
in a county newspaper within 30 days of the issuance of letters testamentary.
246. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-510 provides in part:

Within six (6) months from the date of the notice to creditors, required by § 30-509,
all persons, resident and nonresident, having claims against the estate of the decedent,
• . . shall file them in duplicate with the clerk of the court in which the estate is being
administered. . . . [A]nd every claim shall be verified b affidavit of the creditor
before an officer authorized to administer oaths, which affidavit shall state that the
claim is correct...
247. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-513 provides:
All claims and demands not filed with the county or probate court clerk, as required by
the provisions of §§ 30-509-30-512 or in which suit shall not have been brought or
revised before the end of six (6) months from the date of the notice to creditors, shall be
forever barred.
248. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-514 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 30-510-30-513, the personal representative, if in
his discretion it is deemed proper, may waive the requirement for the filing of and may
pay any claim not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) principal amount. If the act of
the personal representative in so doing is brought into question, he will have the burden
of showing the validity of the claim so paid.
249. See note 191 supra.
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have to be complied with or the validity of the Revenue Rulings will
have to be litigated.
Apparently, under the decisional law of Tennessee there is no
exception to the statutory filing requirement. This fact is borne out
by the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Needham v. Moore,25 and
by an informal attorney general's opinion. T.C.A. section 30-514,
which allows the claim to be paid without filing if it is less than 100
dollars, may provide some relief for the executor because many
claims will be less than this designated amount. Despite this fact,
caution is required because the statute commits the waiver of the
filing requirement to the executor's discretion.25 It is possible that
the Commissioner could find an abuse of discretion even though the
probate court later approved the payment of the claim. In this situation the deduction again would be lost.
As has been discussed, numerous problems can be expected in
the near future in Tennessee because of the recent Revenue Rulings.213 An amendment to section 2053 by Congress is unlikely. A
switch in positions by the Internal Revenue Service would be
equally surprising. Accordingly, perhaps the best approach to alleviate these problems would be an amendment to the Tennessee
Code. Provisions similar to those in the Uniform Probate Code
would be extremely useful.s 4 Another possibility would be a code
section similar to that recently adopted in Florida. 255 The amendment should authorize the executor to pay informal claims presented to him within the six month claims period if the payment has
been approved by the heirs, devisees, and beneficiaries of the estate.
Such a claim would then be allowable and enforceable under Ten250. 292 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1956).
251. On April 8, 1964, the Tennessee Attorney General considered a question concerning
the state inheritance tax. In that opinion, the Attorney General stated that amounts paid to
the decedent's creditors for the expenses of his last illness could not be deducted because the
claims were not filed in the probate court. In that opinion the Attorney General stated:
To concur with the position taken by the executor herein would mean that the Department of Revenue would be cast in the role of a probate court in cases such as the one
posed, abrogating to itself the right and duty of determining whether or not a debt
claimed by a personal representative in his individual capacity was a lawful and proper
one, and not excessive. I cannot believe this is the intention of our inheritance tax or
probate laws.
You are accordingly advised that in my opinion the expenses claimed cannot be
allowed as a deduction.
Op. AssT. Asr'Y GEN., issued to Donald R. King, Commissioner of Revenue (April 8, 1964).
252. See note 248 supra.
253. See notes 194-96 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 237-43 supra and accompanying text.
255. See Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975-1 C.B. 307.
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nessee law despite the creditor's failure to file. This, in turn, would
insure the deductibility of the claim under section 2053.216 In the
meantime, an executor justifiably hesitant to litigate the validity of
the 1975 Revenue Rulings should force every creditor to file his
claim in the probate court in order to be sure that the claim will be
deductible. Although this will cause immense time and expense, the
current Internal Revenue Service position leaves the executor no
real choice.
JAY
256.

See Note, supra note 181, at 681-82.
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